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Essay
Facts, Fictions and Other Artifices:
“Constituent Authority” as the Work of Imagination
ZORAN OKLOPCIC
Increasingly preoccupied with the imaginative dimension of modern
constitutionalism, contemporary theorists are still more inclined to treat the
foundational ideals of modern constitutional government as the work of some
abstract social imagination, rather than to turn their gaze inwards—and reflect on
the ways in which their own creations contribute to those ideals’ survival. The aim
of this Essay is to explore what might such, more self-reflective, and inevitably
more meta-theoretical exercise entail, by paying attention to the tension that runs
through Rick Kay’s seminal work on constituent authority—which in a certain
sense illustrates the predicament of most constitutional scholars: torn between the
imperatives of scholarly sobriety and patriotic loyalty—which makes them more
inclined to rationalize the authority of established constitutional fictions—and
their residual intellectual curiosity, which encourages them to foreground the
inventive, artificial and imaginative character of constitutional government, in
general.
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Facts, Fictions and Other Artifices:
“Constituent Authority” as the Work of Imagination‡
ZORAN OKLOPCIC *
INTRODUCTION
The fiction that replaced the divine right of kings is our
fiction, and it accordingly seems less fictional to us. Only the
cynical among us will scoff at Lincoln’s dedication to
“government of the people, by the people, and for the
people.” Sober thought may tell us that . . . [no government]
can literally be by the people. But sober thought will also tell
us that the sovereignty of the people, however fictional, has
worked.1
[T]raditional authority is based on what we could call the
mystique of the Institution . . . . [W]e know that Authority is a
fiction, but nevertheless this fiction regulates our actual, real
behaviour; we regulate social reality itself as though the
fiction were real. But the cynic . . . does not really accept its
symbolic efficacy, he merely uses it as means of
manipulation. The efficacy of the fiction takes its revenge on
him when a coincidence of the fiction with reality occurs: he
then performs as “his own sucker.” . . . The totalitarian, too,
does not believe in the symbolic fiction . . . he knows very
well that the Emperor is naked. . . . Yet in contrast to
traditional authority, what he adds is not “but nevertheless”
but “just because”: just because the Emperor is naked we
must hold together the more, work for the Good, our Cause is
all the more necessary.2
‡
For Rick Kay, the most global among American constitutionalists; a constitutional imaginer
extraordinaire—in admiration.
*
Associate Professor, Department of Law and Legal Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium Original Constitutionalist: Reconstructing
Richard Kay’s Scholarship (University of Connecticut School of Law, Sept. 13, 2019) and the
Scholars’ Workshop on Global Constitutionalism (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Berlin, Germany).
1
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 38 (1st ed. 1988).
2
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR
249–52 (1991).
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I
Imagination is a social practice, a communal activity, an aspect of life,
a form of work, or an unnamed phenomenon that involves individual
cognition in ways that remain unspecified. It is a process that occurs in a
society, to a society; something that is exercised for the sake of a political
community, or by a community itself. For the most part, its accounts are
re-interpretations of its existing theories of imagination, affirmations of its
importance, and meditations on the imagination of others, such as Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, Schmitt, and other canonical constitutional thinkers.
Amidst the growing number of scholarly works on the phenomenon of
imagination, one is yet to encounter those that directly confront
imagination as the quotidian activity of imagining—not imagination as a
historical phenomenon, but imagination-in-action. Even those that
explicitly embrace the inevitably imaginative character of theory, and who
exhort others to exercise their imaginations more freely, rarely seem to
take their own advice.3 Imagination—like Sartre’s hell—seems to be (for)
the other people.4
Like imagination, “constitution” is not only a name for a done deed, an
artefact, but also for an activity of constituting. If so, what do we imagine
when we imagine the activity of constituting? Constitution as construction?
If so, what would that make of constitutional imagination? A subjective
dimension of the inter-subjective practice that goes under a rather familiar
name of “social construction”? A simple answer to this question is: not
really. A more elaborate answer must address a couple of related questions

3

For a similar point, at a more general level, see EDWARD S. CASEY, IMAGINING: A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY 221 (2d ed. 2000) (“It is a revealing fact that some of the very same
philosophers who publicly denounce imagination make abundant use of imagining in their actual
practice . . . . The result is a paradoxical pattern of denial-cum-acknowledgment in which an express
denigration is accompanied by a covert recognition of the special utility of imagination in the very
process of philosophizing.”).
4
For imagination as “essential for constitutional thinking,” see Oliviero Angeli, Global
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Imagination, 6 G LOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 359, 375 (2017).
For imagination as “harnessed” by contemporary constitutions, see Martin Loughlin, The
Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015). See also GÜNTER FRANKENBERG,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: BETWEEN MAGIC AND DECEIT 16 (2018) (arguing that
“comparative constitutional studies . . . should look at the margins, decipher the rhetoric and start
conversation between centres and peripheries”); Paul Blokker, The Imaginary Constitution of
Constitutions, 3 SOC. IMAGINARIES 167, 168 (2017) (discussing a sociological approach to
constitutionalism); Ji í P ibá , Constitutional Imaginaries and Legitimation: On Potentia, Potestas, and
Auctoritas in Societal Constitutionalism, 45 J.L. & SOC’Y S30, S32 (2018) (arguing that “the theory of
societal constitutionalism has to focus on the presence of non-political power in societal constitutions
and its various forms of politicization and authorization”); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and
Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2004) (noting the use of fire-imagery in
“constitutional myth-making” (emphasis omitted)). For imagination in jurisprudence more broadly, see
generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
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first: what do we mean by construction? Are there acts of imagination that
cannot be reduced to the acts of construction?
According to Ian Hacking, “[t]he core idea behind construction, from
Latin to now, is that of building, of putting together.”5 What is being put
together is something whose existence is taken for granted, however we
call it: bricks, elements, parts, components, building-blocks, and so on.
From that perspective, we constitute constitutions by constructing them
from a set of generic elements. What they are is a matter of perspective:
some scholars will focus on constitutional norms, some on institutions,
some on functional and territorial divisions of power, some on the
distribution of personal, material, and spatial jurisdiction, and some on
underlying principles and their “basic structures.”
Though it is certainly possible to imagine constitutions as (social)
constructions that consist of pre-existing elements, the choice of these
elements is a matter of something else: a perspective, an approach, a point
of view from which we “observe” these, and not those elementary
building-blocks in our world of constitutions. But why “observe” and not
observe? The first answer to this question is short and simple:
observation—as the outcome of observing—depends on the parameters
that define our specific observation protocols and which cannot be reduced
to a rather misleading notion of “perspective.”
II
A longer and more complicated, if ultimately more illuminating
answer, starts off with an illustration whose aim is to demonstrate the
constituent power of our observational frames. Altering their
circumference defines not only the extent of our observation—that is, how
far, or how much we “see”—but, more importantly, the character of what
ends up being observed: what, exactly, we “see.” By way of example,
consider first the effects of changing the scope of our observational frame
in a more natural environment—say, in a forest in which, all of a sudden,
you become aware of a swarming multitude of ants before your feet.
If you narrowed the circumference of your gaze, you’d naturally be
forced to focus your attention on individual ants. Seeing a pine needle atop
of one ant’s back, how would you describe that scene? As the process of
the transportation of the needle by virtue of a moving ant, or as a situation
in which a little ant exists as a willful agent, holding, bringing, taking,
dragging the object in question, and in doing so contributing to the success
of the overall endeavor?
In turn, while you might still refer to such ants as attempting,
persevering, or succeeding, a more panoramic scene would appear if you
5

IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 49 (1999).
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expanded your circumference. You would start considering how different
patterns in their movement and interactions give rise to the emerging
pattern on the ground: a new anthill—the effect of manifold activities that
can be attributed to no single ant in particular. Or, in more formal terms:
“the narrowing of the circumference thus encourage[s] . . . the stress upon
the ‘efficient cause’” 6—it encourages, in other words, the focus on an
agent that causes the act in question.
Expanding the circumference, in contrast (looking at the proverbial
bigger picture) situates that actor’s willful agency within a broader
landscape of (inter-)action. Within that landscape, the references to that
agent’s “will” reveal themselves as one of the oblique ways to describe the
purpose of agency within a broader field of struggle. We see the same logic
at work behind the vocabularies we use to make sense of some of the most
violent global phenomena, such as the conflicts over territorial sovereignty.
We have no qualms about personifying the formal holders of the right to
self-determination.
However when we happen to imagine them, we tend to speak of them
as the peoples that willingly and willfully accept, reject, aspire, struggle,
fight, decide, or otherwise act like giant humanoid actors. Notice, however,
that we may only do so if we zoom in on those struggles. That is, if we
observe them from close up, from close enough to forget, that is, about the
broader environments in which we’d detect not the acts of will, but rather
the effects of spatiotemporal reconfiguration that can be attributed to no
sovereign will in particular.
The problem with these suggestions is not that they are not intimately
connected with the practice of imagination, but rather that they still don’t
say much about the ways one might more deliberately and purposefully
exercise imagination as the participant in the scholarly practice of
constitutional theory. In order to do so, it is necessary to begin by making
three important distinctions: (1) “between process and the product,
between the way one gets there, and the result,” both of which are alluded
to by the “-tion”-suffixed verbal nouns such as constitution, or
imagination;7 (2) between imagination as a purposeful activity and the acts
of imagining; and (3) between the imagined activities of scholars—from
those that do not appear as imagined at all (such as theorizing,
conceptualizing, or defining)—to those, which only seem to make sense if
we are able to imagine what they involve in action.
At different levels of abstraction, such activities will typically include:
(i) delineating, such as drawing a line that separates an inside from an
outside, trivially, but also in more concrete, and kinetically complex ways;
6
7

KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 79 (1969).
HACKING, supra note 5, at 36.
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(ii) cutting (e.g. carving out a national homeland from a territory of a
sovereign state with the help of a foreign or detaching a pre-existing
territorial unit from a federation); (iii) moving, from one standpoint to
another; (iv) zooming and focusing, and, at some point something which is
perhaps most economically described metaphorically; and (v) choosing an
optical, recording, or some other instrument that will determine the
outcome of the observer’s observations.
III
While the vocabulary of modern constitutionalism constantly reminds
us of a necessity to cut—to cut off (de-cidere) and cut out (ex-capere)—we
never really create new “ideas and structures from scratch.”8 In doing so,
we rarely confront the question of what is constitutionalism, to begin with.
It could be an ideal (like communism), an era (like nationalism), a system
(like socialism), a tendency (like majoritarianism), a phenomenon (like
populism), a state of affairs (like antagonism), an achievement (like
pluralism), or a logic (like capitalism). In the case with Rick’s
constitutionalism, it is a general pre-disposition: a risk-averse attitude
which “prefers the awkwardness of rigidly bound state action to the
possibility that government will overshoot the mark in dealing with new
circumstances” and is ready “to concede the costs of suboptimal public
responses to change as an acceptable price to pay for the security
obtained.”9
Rick’s constitutionalism takes for granted the “liberal view” on “the
optimal conditions for developing human welfare,” which “supposes that
human thriving is most likely to be obtained in a life that is largely
self-defined.”10 Though it would be possible to critique this view, for
ignoring that the questions of “how to live one’s life . . . [have] already
been answered, implicitly or explicitly, in every social formation . . .
[including those] that embrace[] the pluralism of forms of life,”11 what’s
important to notice is something that might otherwise be easy to ignore:
beyond preventing over-reach, mitigating broadly-defined evils, regulating
narrowly-defined objects, and restraining other public actions, the basic
existential function of Rick’s constitution is not to serve the interests of a
sovereign people as its trans-generational collective author. Rather, it is to

8

NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL
LAW 27 (2010).
9
Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 16, 24 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (emphasis added).
10
Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 33 (2000).
11
RAHEL JAEGGI, Preface, CRITIQUE OF FORMS OF LIFE (Ciaran Cronin Trans., Belknap Press
2018).
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make the life of the people it governs—whoever they may happen to be, in
one way or another—better.
If so, could we, perhaps, imagine what it looks like? We should be able
to. Rick’s essays are full of industrial equipment—“explicit machinery for
periodic constitutional revision,”12 “the machinery for electing and
convening the convention,”13 “the active machinery of government,”14
“structural machinery of constitutionalism,”15 “state machinery,”16 the
“decision-making machinery that claims to represent the consent of the
human population,”17 the non-existent “machinery for submitting national
lawmaking to a popular vote,”18 the “institutional machinery constituting
the Canadian state,”19 and the “old machinery of colonial legal authority.”20
Not only are constitutions the creatures of our imagination, but we
construct them, and live ‘under’ them.21 Constitutions are structures which
exist in 3D!
Could some such structure be what Rick might have had before his
eyes when he made an effort to stress that the constitutions which “define[]
the institutions and procedures required to effect genuine acts of the
government created” do not simply lay down the law, but that they actually
“constitute[] in the literal sense?”22 Though intriguing, it is actually hard
to imagine that “ordinary or primary” sense of the term “constitution”
would refer to anything else but some more or less ceremonious
proclamation that the rules and principles inscribed in the parchment are
from that moment on “in force” as the supreme law of the land.
Not only is that idea hard to imagine, but it is quite possible that in
languages other than English—including my native Serbo-Croatian—the
only way to make sense of the notion of “constitutions that literally
constitute” is to invent a new verb on the spot (ustavi koji doslovno
“ustavljaju?”) which probably wouldn’t make much sense either—at least
not the one which I manufactured a moment ago—and which reads that

12

Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 726 (2011).
Id. at 728.
14
Richard S. Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, in LAW UNDER A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 199, 223 (Lisa Burton
Crawford et al. eds., 2019).
15
Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 16.
16
Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14.
17
Richard S. Kay, Changing the U.K. Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE LAW 98, 113 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison L. Young eds., 2013).
18
Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government, and Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 209.
19
Richard S. Kay, The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327, 335
(2003).
20
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 733.
21
Id. at 743.
22
Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 32 (emphasis added).
13
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“constitution literally block,” or, more archaically, “literally establish a
dam.”
IV
A constitution is an artifice—as is constituent authority. The material
we have for constructing it may be “malleable,” and though it “may be
many things,” constituent authority “is not anything we want it to be.”23
Ultimately, it depends on the “prevailing attitudes” of those on the ground,
and which ultimately depend on their own “perception” of it.24 In order to
provide an adequate description of constituent authority it is important to
consider those attitudes through examination25 of “complicated and
ill-defined practices” and “processes of constitution-making and
constitutional application.”26 Which “prevailing attitudes” to consider?
And “prevailing” where?
Rick’s answer is that it is “reasonable to assume we are dealing with
some group of individuals associated with some territory.”27 But why? We
don’t get an answer to that question because Rick pre-empts it with starting
that sentence with “although we can imagine other possibilities,” which, on
first look appears as a concession (true, “we can imagine” constituent
authority otherwise) but which can also be read as if you don’t think this
account of constituent authority is reasonable, you are free to imagine
“other possibilities,” so suit yourself.28 None of this is to say that making
that assumption is unreasonable—only that to the extent we think that
making it is reasonable, it is in light of some “other possibilities” that we
must have already considered—which is to say, imagined.
So while it may be reasonable to conclude that “[t]he continuing
normative force of constitutions” depends on attributing them to the acts of
will of territorially delineated political communities, that conclusion may
not be so reasonable if we assumed that a number of those communities
belong to a federal state, whose integrity they contest, or within a
supranational organization, as the peoples of its member-states.29 Which
one to focus on is not a matter of what is reasonable, but of a motivated
preference, which involves not only the choice of a spatiotemporal frame
within which the attitudes of those on the ground are to be observed, but
also those that involve further where to look, how, and in what capacity. If,
for example, you:
23

Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 761.
Id. at 756.
25
Id. at 720.
26
Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 32.
27
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 739.
28
Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
29
Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 10, at 39.
24
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imagine you’re a Martian, looking down on Earth, and you
look into national constitutional courts and you hear what
they’re saying and then you look into Luxembourg at the
Court of Justice and you hear what they’re saying . . . you
can’t make any sense of it, you can’t reconcile it. They all
think they’re sovereign, they all think they’re supreme.30
One does not have to imagine being a Martian, or someone who is
looking at the EU from outer space; one can also choose to approach the
situation from within one of the jurisdictions on the ground. If that
jurisdiction is “national”—then that’s that: “national monism is correct.”31
And vice versa: “[i]f we are within the EU jurisdiction,” then the “EU
monism is correct.”32 This would still make Rick’s claim true, but only
relative to the contingent preferences of the one who is doing the
“considering.”
At that point, it becomes obvious that what shapes Rick’s, and
everyone else’s account of constituent authority includes not just the
objective constraints—which prevent it from being “anything we want it to
be”—and not just our more or less self-aware attempts to determine “many
things” that constituent authority could be—but also something, which we
inevitably do want it to be.33 That does not mean that we have stopped
observing what is going on the ground, only that the “observed quality . . .
that enables [persons] to produce [a] . . . constitution” (as Rick defines
“constituent authority”) will not be independent from mostly unchosen
ways of looking at things, but many of which are—upon reflection—
eminently under the control of “observer”-theorist.34
What influences those ways, as we’ve just seen a moment ago, is a
number of choices each of which could be made differently: a standpoint
(somewhere from outer space, from which you can gaze both at the
European Court of Justice in Luxemburg and national apex courts,
wherever they are), orientation (first toward Luxemburg then toward
national apex courts) as well as a number of other acts of imagination.
As an illustration of how constitutional theory looks in practice once
seen as a mental effort that involves (more or less deliberate) activity of
imagining, it’s useful to go back to Abbé Sieyès and Carl Schmitt—not
only because their work, for better or worse, remains critical to
30

Shavana Musa & Eefje de Volder, Interview with Professor Neil Walker, Global Law: Another
Case of the Emperor’s Clothes?, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2012).
31
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 RATIO JURIS 365, 373 (2010).
32
Id.
33
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 761 (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 720. See also KENDALL L. WALTON, MIMESIS AS MAKE-BELIEVE: ON THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL ARTS 15 (1990) (“If I find myself musing, spontaneously, about a candystriped polar bear jumping over the moon, I may nevertheless realize that I could, if I wanted to,
imagine instead a polka-dotted grizzly jumping over a star, or that I could stop imagining altogether.”).
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contemporary constitutional theory—but also because Rick uses them as
sparring partners in his own work on constituent authority.
In trying to show what separates them imaginatively, my aim is not to
take issue with Rick’s overall assessment of either of them, nor with an
important tension that Rick detected which—far from trivial or
inconsequential—still remains ignored in recent conversations about
constituent power:
The classic invocations of “constituent power” stress that it
requires no justification, legal or moral. “Every attribute of
the nation,” said Sieyès, “springs from the simple fact that it
exists,” and Schmitt said that the will of the “constitutionmaking power is existentially present: its power or authority
lies in its being.”
This cannot be the whole story.35
Though what constitutes the “whole story” will always be a matter of
dispute, Sieyès’s three-part drama begins with a scene in which we
encounter a group of “isolated individuals” who, in “seeking to unite,” are
already a “nation.”36 In the second “epoch” (which we’ve reached by
fast-forwarding to a point in which we encounter an already sizeable
nation) whose members, wishing to give their union “consistency” begin
exercising their “constituent power” in “local parishes”—and in the third
epoch—by sending their delegates to the regional assemblies, who in turn
send their own to a nation-wide constituent assembly, which ends up
exercising the “constituent power” which is today subject of so many
theoretical conversations.37
All this happens within a compressed time frame with Sieyès
expanding and refining our gaze each step of the way: from what is
ostensibly a scene in the state of nature, on to a more panoramic landscape
that features numerous “parishes,” and finally onto the most-encompassing
view, which presents us with what is effectively the administrative map of
actual France—divided into “forty thousand parishes,” no more no less.38
In contrast, Schmitt presents us with a scene in which “the people” are
assembled for whatever purpose, to the extent that it does not
only appear as an organized interest group, for example,
during street demonstrations and public festivals, in theaters,
on the running track, or in the stadium, this people engaged
35

Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 721 (internal citations omitted).
EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS: INCLUDING
THE DEBATE BETWEEN SIEYÈS AND TOM PAINE IN 1791, at 134 (Michael Sonenscher ed. & trans.,
2003).
37
Id. at 136.
38
Id. at 140.
36
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in acclamation is present, and it is, at least potentially, a
political entity.39
What we witness, in both cases, are different ways of doing what every
constitutional theorist must do somehow: turn events and processes into
figures, which others can more easily get a handle on. What we “observe”
in both cases, are not simply events or processes, but the recordings of
events and processes, which either move too fast for us to see the bloody
history of wars and civil wars that shaped France into the receptacle of one
nation (as with Sieyès) or which are cut too short for us to “observe” what
happens next after the revolutionary moment of “acclamation.”40
What we hope to see next—at least if we sympathize with the specific
aspirations of the members of this entity—is to “evoke powerful emotions”
and provoke a “coordinated action that cold-blooded calculation would not
have produced”—especially when an “initial event is especially vivid and
information on the true strength of a regime is scarce.”41 Whether this
“reality simplifying heuristic” indeed has potential to accelerate the turn of
events, and perhaps even reduce the amount of violence typically involved
in such events—it will “lead people to overestimate the vulnerability of
their own authoritarian regimes” and bring conflict to a next phase in
which it will become more obvious whether the original event triggered a
revolution that’s coming to its end, or a potentially endless civil war.42
V
At this point it is important to notice a fundamental difference between
this “political entity” and a “political entity” that appears on the pages of
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political four years later—at a point when he lost
39

CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 272 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press
2008) (1928). See also Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power, 10 CAN. J.L.
& JURIS. 189, 198 (1997) (explaining that “Schmitt underscores the foundational nature of constituent
activity. Constituent power qua sovereign transcends the constitution; the manner of its activity cannot
be prescribed constitutionally”). For the recent perspectives on constituent power more generally, see
Martin Loughlin, On Constituent Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LIBERALISM 151, 151–53
(Michael W. Dowdle & Michael A. Wilkinson eds., 2017); Yaniv Roznai, “We the People,” “Oui, the
People” and the Collective Body: Perceptions of Constituent Power, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 295, 295 (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds., 2018) (“[Constituent
power] is the power to establish the constitutional order of a nation.”); J OEL I. COLÓN-RIOS, WEAK
CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 8
(2012) (defining constituent power “as the power to create a constitution together, with the
participation of those subject to it”).
40
EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of
France in 1789, in POLITICAL WRITINGS: INCLUDING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SIEYÈS AND TOM PAINE
IN 1791, at 37 (Michael Sonenscher ed. & trans., 2003).
41
Henry E. Hale, Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions
to the 2011 Arab Uprisings, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 331, 336 (2013).
42
Id. at 336.
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interest in a constitutional theory that rests on “abstractions” and
“normative ideals.”43 Unlike the former, this second “entity” is not an
ensemble of actors in the plural (the people who are engaged in act of
acclamation) or an emblematic actor (the people, as potential political
entities, possess the will for an independent political existence). In contrast
to the one that appears on the pages of Constitutional Theory and which is
set on a stage as an ensemble of protagonists who exercise their constituent
power, the “entity” that appears in The Concept of the Political is an
ensemble of a different kind: not an ensemble of actors, but an ensemble of
members.
Rather than set on a stage as an actor in a scene, this ensemble is
engineered into theoretical existence. It is a set of elements which satisfy a
particular membership function, not a concrete manifestation of the
friend-enemy distinction. Rather than the incarnation of the ontological
category of the political, Schmitt’s political “entity” is an ensemble of
those who allow the “entity” to satisfy the following three criteria: (1) to
embody “the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation”44; (2) to
be oriented toward the “most extreme possibility”45 of existential conflict
with an enemy; and (3) to exist as “a totality of men that fights at least
potentially”46 and stand in opposition to a corresponding totality. Though
we don’t know how many of those who belong to this entity must
themselves conform to these criteria we must assume that a preponderant
majority, if not all of them, will.
How is this account different from another famous one, of Sieyès, who
defines the nation (people) as a “body of associates?”47 The traditional
answer of constitutional theory: Schmitt’s political “entity” evokes an
ethnocentric conception of a constitutional subject, while Sieyès’s
conception evokes a civic, aspirational ideal of common political
community. However, the difference between the two is also a difference
between two kinds of sets. Sieyès’s “body of associates” is a crisp set,
whose membership is defined through the application of a binary
criterion—the “associates” either belong or don’t belong to the “same
legislature.”48 In contrast, Schmitt’s “entity” is not a crisp, but a fuzzy
set—a figure that could have been reconfigured had Schmitt decided to
scan the multiplicity of attitudes on the ground by calibrating the
measuring protocols of his optical module differently.
43

See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab & J. Harvey
Lomax trans., 1996) (1932) (examining the nature of “the political”).
44
Id. at 26.
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Id. at 35.
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Id. at 87.
47
SIEYÈS, What is the Third Estate?, supra note 36, at 97.
48
Id.

1370

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:5

What follows from this, at the very minimum, is a very sensible
question: What do theorists hope to achieve—and for what reasons do they
think it beneficial to take a very small number of people who may be
understood as acting jointly, and treat them synecdochally—pars pro toto,
as the stand-in for all the members of a polity? Rick’s answer: “Sooner or
later . . . people will ask what it is about the creation of a constitution that
obliges them to respect it. [Even though] [p]erceptions of the founding
events . . . are liable to change over time . . . for a constitution to endure
over decades or centuries, it will be necessary for [a respectful] attitude
toward the constitution-makers to persist.”49
However, “a constitution [that could] endure over decades or
centuries”50 is a rather strange expectation to have. Especially in a world in
which most constitutions don’t live long enough to reach adolescence (let
alone senescence), and where those that do, such as the British
constitution, don’t even know all the names of its many founding step
fathers.
The only constitution to expect to live for another two hundred years
is, of course, the American—and definitely not the Japanese (imposed by
an occupying power, and dictated personally by Douglas McArthur),51 or
the Canadian (flown over from Britain, and delivered by the Queen of
England, as more or less according to the plans of Pierre Elliott Trudeau),52
or the Bosnian (extorted from the leaders of the warring parties by Richard
Holbrooke in Dayton, Ohio).53
Most constitutions around the world actually die very young—and yet
somehow manage to fulfill at least some, if not all of their basic duties in
the nineteen short years they spend on this earth.54 Why add to the stress
level of the local populations, who in addition to everything else, now need
to worry about investing extra effort in making something that they
probably don’t need in the first place: a more durable constitution? How
likely is it that their allegiance—whatever it is—actually does contribute to
its success?
Rick says that the “success of the United States government has been
substantially established on a wide and deep popular attachment to the

49

Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 12, at 757.
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51
Occupation of Japan and the New Constitution, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/american
experience/features/macarrthur-occupation-japan-and-constitution/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
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Canada Act: Canada-United Kingdom [1982], ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
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Bill Clinton, Dayton Accords: International Agreement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
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Constitution and to the idea of constitutional government in general” —in
part due to “a belief that the Constitution does limit governmental action
and that the courts will, when called on to do so, apply those limitations.”56
But does such attachment really exist, given the marked absence of
constitutional representations from American popular culture? The number
of streets named “Constitution,” or paintings featuring the act of forming
the Constitution, or local government departments which feature
“Constitution” in their name, or the amount of public support for its public
celebration is minuscule in comparison to those featuring other patriotic
ideals.57
Given the paucity of the Constitution’s representations in American
culture—and a particularly lackluster attitude toward the official
commemorations of its significance—it is fair to ask what Rick means by
the success of the United States government and whether that success has
more to do with the actual success that government has had in making a
material difference in the lives of its citizens, or can be (especially in the
early days of the Republic) attributed to the Constitution itself.
Which is to say: the success owed not to “undiscriminating and blind
worship” of a visible artefact that evokes reverent awe for an event in
which a sovereign people established a new order of things (as Hannah
Arendt famously suggested)58 but to a visible improvement—“fields a few
years ago waste and uncultivated [now] filled with inhabitants and covered
with harvests, new habitations reared, contentment in every face, [and]
plenty on every board”—as the “effect [that] was the intent of the
Constitution,” and a sign that “it has succeeded.”59
VI
A Constitution, says Rick, is an “artifice” whose “success . . . depends
on the ability, at any given time, to posit a narrative about its creation that
is both politically acceptable and, if not historically accurate, at least
historically plausible.”60 Like all narratives, foundational narratives are
55

Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 49.
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multifunctional devices. While they remain instrumental to the attempts to
justify institutional authority and explain constitutional legitimacy, in
doing so they also always have the potential to function as coping
mechanisms, enjoyment catalysts, and distraction devices.
As coping mechanisms, the task of foundational narratives is not to
justify and legitimize, but explain and rationalize. As is the case with all
autobiographical narrations, their task is to reconcile us with our traumatic
past that continues to reverberate in our frustrating present, or with our
frustrating present that can be overcome in light of our glorious past. From
that perspective, foundational narratives are part of an ongoing
cognitive-behavioral therapy of more or less traumatic political disorders.
While perhaps put too flippantly, Jean Baudrillard’s insight about what
is wrong with the obsession of contemporary constitutional theorists with
narrative and its role in the formation of collective identity points in the
right direction: “Identity is . . . absurdity. You dream of being yourself
when you’ve nothing better to do. You dream of that when you’ve lost all
singularity.”61 More charitably, successful foundational narratives will
reconcile us with our situation, reduce our political frustrations, and bring
us together as a people and give us hope, patience, courage, generosity,
energy, and insight—or even wisdom—individually.
There is a reverse side to that, though. Rhetorically successful
narratives will also catalyze, if marginally, the effectiveness of
constitutional democracy as a regime of affect-management. Here, the task
of narratives is to maintain the picture of democratic institutions as
instrumental to the processes of collective self-government, while at the
same time concealing how they would appear in relief: not as the
instruments of opinion- and will-formation of a demos (that transform
individual preferences into collective decisions of a demos), but as the
instruments of affect-modulation (that, depending on the situation may
with different degrees of success intensify, focalize, suppress, neutralize,
divert, disperse, or otherwise organize the flows of eros that have the
potential to turn demos into an ethnos).
VII
Constitutions, Rick also says, are the “creatures of our intelligence and
imagination,” but “from time to time,” there is some value in reminding
ourselves, “of the fictions that support [our institutions], and [of] our stake

what we imagine. For such a form to ‘take,’ a certain continuity in content and manner of presentation
is required. In the absence of such continuity, isolated episodes may appear, but they will not fit
together to constitute anything like a story.”).
61
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, PAROXYSM: INTERVIEWS WITH PHILIPPE PETIT 49 (Chris Turner trans.,
1998).

2021]

FACTS, FICTIONS AND OTHER ARTIFICES

1373

62

in behavior that conforms to those fictions.” Though Rick concludes that
our “final belief” must be in a fiction,63 in his account of constituent
authority he ends up producing at least seven different figures of the
people:
(1) the people as the “‘imaginary collective body of the
group’ capable of signifying the assent of the real human
beings who are to be governed by the constituted
power”;64
(2) the people capable of “authentic representation,” and
having successful “surrogates”;65
(3) the people as a “society” which has “formed an
awareness of belonging together that can support
majority decisions and solidarity efforts”;66
(4) the people as a (corporate) person, detected on the basis
of criteria, and capable of acting “with all the attributes
of personality, conscience and will”;67
(5) the “people capable of exercising constituent authority”
but incapable of being defined by a “precise
algorithm”;68
(6) the people whose “perfectly unmediated voice” is
“necessarily a fiction,” and whose will may only have
infrequent, “crude expressions,” and which can never be
expressed with “nuance or qualification”;69 and finally
(7) constituent “people,” as the supplier of the “necessary
consent of the governed to the law to be made by the
constituted powers.”70
These are not the same figures. Still, each of them conforms to the
ideal of the “political rightness of self-government,”71 not dissimilar from
Frank Michelman’s definition of “[p]opular political self-government”: a
government where the people, themselves, “decid[e] . . . the contents . . . of
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the laws that organize and regulate their political association,” where
governors, govern “in accordance with the interests of the people,” “on
sufferance of popular majorities,” in conformity with “the electoral and
representational schemes for toting those majorities,” and “geared to a fair
reflection of interests in the population”—which, gives us a reason to
believe that they will “attend decently well to the interests of the governed
. . . government for the people.”73
And that, at a minimum, involves a “measure of responsiveness,” but
that doesn’t tell us whether a “measure of responsiveness” that government
owes to its citizens involves “continuing responsiveness . . . to [their]
preferences,”74 nor does it tell us how large or small that measure should
be, nor what that responsiveness consists of—to begin with. So, it is quite
possible to consider the same people as theoretically “decisive in
democratic determinations[,]” but at the same time give “no weight to what
actual people think in any specific political moment.”75 This is especially
true if—as Kim Lane Scheppele suggests—the notion that “the present and
the preferences of actually existing people should have no particular moral
weight” is “cooked into [the] training” of constitutional theorists.76
On closer look, the indispensability of popular sovereignty to liberal
democracy has been far from established in the literature. An eminent
volume on constitutionalism from the late 1970s, mentions neither popular
sovereignty, the people, nor the community as concepts,77 which most
contemporary theorists, preoccupied with the questions of constitutional
identity, self-constitution, and constituent power, cannot seem to imagine
as imaginary. Likewise, contributors to a widely regarded volume on
“constitutionalism in transition” from the 1990s, make no mention of
popular sovereignty in their discussions of the structure, functions, and
forms of limited, mixed, republican, and democratic constitutions.78
72
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If Bernard Yack is right, the doctrine of popular sovereignty invests
“final authority in an imagined community”79 whose historical act of will
set the foundations for the existing constitutional order, but remains
agnostic on who rules in its name in the meantime.80 While Yack agrees
that popular sovereignty “promotes a more egalitarian picture of political
order . . . [and] can easily become the starting point for justifications for
more democratic forms of government,”81 he also claims that it would be
“a mistake . . . to identify the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty with
commitment to democratic forms of government”82—a position similar to
that of Daniel Lee, who argues that “popular sovereignty has essentially
nothing to do with democracy.”83
If so, liberal (constitutional) democracy is not necessarily a popular
form of government. And vice versa: liberal democracy may be a form of
popular government even when its constitutive principle appears
antithetical to the principle of popular sovereignty. Would Rick agree with
this proposition? Though I am not sure that he would, that conclusion
could be inferred from Rick’s remarks on the predicament of “unelected
constitutional courts” in contemporary constitutional democracies. 84 These
“unelected constitutional courts” enjoy “a high regard from the population”
as the institutions whose authority derives from a popularly-adopted
constitution, yet are easily seen as “non-democratic” within a broader
system of government that is essentially “mixed.”85 What can we infer
from this? At least five things, I think:
(i)

that it is possible for an institution to be both
“non-democratic” and “popular”;

(ii)

that a “non-democratic” institution can still be
legitimate if it belongs to a system of government
which is sufficiently well regarded—which is to say
“popular”;

(iii)

that “popular” government and
government are not coterminous;

“democratic”

PERSPECTIVES 122, 122 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996) (discussing the conflicts
over self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe).
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(iv)

that liberal democracy may be both democratic as
well as popular government even though it doesn’t
subscribe to the principle of popular sovereignty; and

(v)

that liberal democracy may be a “mixed” form of
government—that is “popular” because it’s
democratic and vice versa, or that is “democratic” as
well as “popular.”

This is what Rick might have had in mind when he concluded that
contemporary constitutional democracies still conform to
[t]he constitutional scheme designed by the American
founders . . . [who] intended to separate the active machinery
of government from the choices of the populace, so that the
‘public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, [who presumed that such government] will be more
consonant to the public good then if pronounced by the
people themselves, convened for the purpose’. But [who]
also meant to provide machinery that could not long function
in contradiction with deeply held desires of the population. . .
. [On this scheme] it was sufficient that a republican
government ‘derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people, and is administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure and for a limited period,
or during good behavior’. All our modern ‘constitutional
democracies’, even those with constitutional courts that have
slipped the bonds of the constitutional text, satisfy that
definition.86
Theoretically speaking, Rick is probably right. But whether modern
constitutional democracies satisfy this definition depends on the
assumption that it is indeed the case that they actually “could not long
function in contradiction with deeply held desires of the population.”87
Whether that is, indeed the case, depends not only on one’s sense of what
counts as “contradiction” in this context, but also on what counts as the
“desires of the population”—as well as on one’s assumption about how
long its institutions can go on ignoring them. And that, in turn, depends
which desires one considers to be typically “deeply held,” and which ones,
not.88
86
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But there is a practical angle to this entire issue. It is one thing to say
that all constitutional democracies still, in principle, count as forms of
government, which are in some broad sense, “of” and “by” the people
because they still cannot “long function in contradiction with deeply held
desires of the population.”89 But this still doesn’t settle the issue of whether
such forms of government ought to count as the governments, which are
for the people, whose constitution in order to count as “the people’s law . .
. must meet [the] need” of the people.90
VIII
The references to the “people,” (their “will,” “sovereignty,”
“authority,” and “decision”) and “democracy” muddle the issue. They
distract us from the connotations of the adjectives “popular” and
“democratic,” which range is not unlimited, and which are not completely
dependent on the terms they qualify. Instead, they seem to have a hard
core, which travels with them wherever they go, and which—in a number
of instances—prefigures the meaning of those terms, as well as our
attitudes toward what they signify.
For instance: the idea that national parliaments tend to be consumed by
“intemperate passions and . . . fluctuations” (as Alexander Hamilton
suggested)91 will make far more sense if we imagine a typical national
parliament as “a popular assembly”92 instead of a democratic legislature—
not just because we’ve replaced a term that primarily connotes a gathering
(assembly) with one that refers to the more serious business of making
laws (legislature)—but also because we’ve imagined that body as
“democratic,” which is to say, a kind of body that tends to “impose
procedures on [itself] that help to ensure that [its members] act carefully,
not hastily; wisely, not foolishly.”93
Though theorists differ in how they see the role of a sovereign people
in a modern constitutional democracy, most of them don’t really think that
it was the people which spoke the American constitution into existence—
or which demonstrated its sovereign will by deciding to leave the European

those “deeply held desires,” and even more so, if they reflect the desires that, in our estimation, deserve
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Union, or which dethroned Evo Morales in an act of democratic
revolution.95
Though hardly enthusiastic about the idea of an actually existing,
sovereign, and politically-unified political community, many contemporary
constitutional theorists still refuse to look beyond the horizons of popular
sovereignty. Rather than explicitly responding to the objections of those
who see the ideals of popular sovereignty as outdated, counterproductive,
or dangerous, many—if not most—contemporary constitutionalists simply
continue as usual. Though well aware of the objections that could be raised
against the notions of popular sovereignty in theory as well as in practice,
their unstated response seems to conform to the formula: “I know very
well, but nevertheless . . . .”
Among the scholars who’d be inclined to say so, there are those who
know very well that a constitutional order is not authored by the people,
but nonetheless believe that the ideals of popular sovereignty manifest
themselves whenever a mass of citizens takes part in democratic elections,
overthrows a despotic government in a revolution, or makes a decision in a
referendum that results in secession.
Then there are those who encourage others to see the people as the
author of a constitutional order for the reasons that have nothing to do with
the ideals of popular sovereignty, and even though they know very well
that the people never existed and never will—but who nevertheless, when
the moment comes, cannot resist missing an uprising against a dictator as
an act of popular revolution, the result of a referendum as the manifestation
of popular will, or the adoption of a new constitution as an act of popular
self-determination.
And then, finally, there are those who know very well that the people
don’t exist, that there is no such thing as the sovereignty of the people, but
who nevertheless defend these conceptions because they have a privileged
insight into its true significance and its indispensable contribution.
Which one is Rick Kay—is hard to say. On the one hand, Rick doesn’t
maintain a critical attitude toward fictions at all times. “We construct rules,
institutions, relationships, values and then we live in them. The character
and success of our lives,” he says, “are genuinely determined by those
creatures of our own intelligence and imagination.”96 At the same time, he
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sides with Wallace Stevens, believing that “[f]inal belief must be in a
fiction.”97 The fiction of what?—and for what?—remain open questions.

97
R. D. Ackerman, Believing in Fiction: Wallace Stevens at the Limits of Phenomenology, 3
PHIL. & LITERATURE 79, 80 (1979).

